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## KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS FOR FY 1976

### Introduction

1. These Key Intelligence Questions are designed to be responsive to and to support the Substantive Objectives of the Intelligence Community for FY 1976 as noted by the United States Intelligence Board on June 13, 1975, prior to the submission of those Objectives to the President.

2. The Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1976 are issued as guidance to the Intelligence Community for the collection and production of intelligence on subjects of major importance to national-level intelligence consumers during FY 1976. These Key Intelligence Questions obviously do not exhaust the universe of consumer needs; there are additional important categories of intelligence collection and production which are not included in this priority national intelligence guidance:

(a) *Lower priority national intelligence subjects:*

These are deliberately omitted in order to emphasize the importance of the Key Intelligence Questions. It is recognized that some attention must be devoted to lower priority subjects, such as developments in Africa, although wherever possible less expensive and less difficult collection techniques should be employed. A level

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of attention must also be devoted to countries and issues deemed likely to become important some years from now, even though they may not pose immediate or pressing major problems during FY 1976.

(b) *Departmental and tactical intelligence:* This includes the intelligence requirements of the several Cabinet departments and independent agencies with foreign intelligence needs, of the operational commanders of US forces, of certain other US officials (such as Ambassadors), as well as certain warning and surveillance activities. An appropriate portion of the national intelligence effort must be devoted to meeting these needs, and the National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations will take them into account. Continuing efforts will be made to improve the interaction and mutual support of national and tactical intelligence programs so that the needs of each level may be served by the same activities to the maximum extent possible. In framing these Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1976, careful consideration was also paid to departmental objectives with national implications or overtones. The Defense Key Intelligence Questions which replaced the Critical Near-Term Defense Intelligence Objectives of the Department of Defense were given special attention.

3. The Key Intelligence Questions are circulated for the following purposes:

(a) *First*, to insure that these subjects are given priority in the regular collection and production activities of appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.

(b) *Second*, to enable review of collection and production planning by the member agencies of the Intelligence Community via a brief, succinct Strategy Report prepared on each KIQ under the aegis of the appropriate National Intelligence Officer.

(c) *Third*, to provide the basis for a recapitulation and evaluation, after the close of the fiscal year, of the performance of the Intelligence Community -- and of individual agencies -- on each of the Key Intelligence Questions.

(d) *Fourth*, to permit the conclusions drawn from the recapitulation and evaluation of the FY 1976 effort to be used as factors in Community resource allocations, and in the preparation of the National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations which the Director of Central Intelligence will be sending to the President.

4. The Key Intelligence Questions have been grouped, where

possible, under one of the five *Substantive Objectives* for the Intelligence Community as submitted to the President by the Director of Central Intelligence. The order in which the FY 1976 questions are listed should not be regarded as implying an internal priority: by definition, all the *Key Intelligence Questions* are of major importance.

5. Additions or modifications to the Key Intelligence Questions may be issued from time to time during FY 1976, if major changes in the international situation or the foreign intelligence environment should so dictate.

## DCI SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES FOR FY 1976

PROVIDE RELIABLE AND TIMELY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, ASSESSMENTS, AND ESTIMATES TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN POLICY FORMULATION, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON:

### SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 1

*Soviet policies, intentions, and capabilities for the execution of political, security and economic programs, with particular reference to:*

- *changes in Soviet leadership and the dynamics of and factors affecting Soviet decision making.*
- *providing early warning of scientific and technical advances which could significantly affect the US national security or national welfare.*
- *major developments in Soviet military RDT&E of weapon systems, deployment, and order of battle.*
- *Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, possible Mutual Balanced Force Reduction agreements, and the observance of cease-fire or peace treaty arrangements; Soviet perception of US and Allied negotiating positions and force capabilities with respect to these issues.*
- *Soviet extension of political influence and military power outside of the USSR.*

### KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

#### SOVIET POLITICAL DYNAMICS

1. What are the prospects for progress, stagnation, or cooling in bilateral Soviet-US relations?

Include how the USSR evaluates the US as both adversary and partner, particularly in arms control negotiations, economic relations, and competition in major regions of the world?

2. How are the political alignments and policy priorities of the Soviet hierarchy and key interest groups developing as the USSR undertakes the 25th Party Congress and looks toward a post-Brezhnev era?

Consider what difference the eventual departure of the Politburo seniors might make in Soviet policy-making.

3. What are Soviet objectives and current policy in the following areas?

Western and Southern Europe -- with special attention to Portugal. Consider the levels of Soviet assistance to important Communist Parties and fronts. The Middle East, including attitudes and tactics toward an Arab-Israeli settlement or renewed hostilities; bilateral Soviet dealings with the major regional states; the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Asia (Northeast, Southeast and South) in the post-Vietnam period.

4. In the Sino-Soviet relationship, what are the capabilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides -- conflict, confrontation, accommodation, or continued uneasy stalemate?

5. What is the importance to the Soviets of imported Western technology, and how successful are they in acquiring and using it?

Particular importance attaches to technology having possible economic and military utility.

#### SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

6. What are Soviet objectives, policies, deployment plans and perceptions relating to strategic weapons and the strategic balance?

Give particular attention to how the Soviets rationalize their strategic weapons programs and what goals they have set for themselves in the area of strategic weaponry vis-a-vis the US -- such as catching up, or attaining some sort of superiority.

7. What doctrine, strategy, and plans do the Soviets have for the command and control and use of strategic nuclear forces, including limited employment of nuclear weapons?

Include any support provided by manned space systems.

8. What are the prospects that Soviet dependency on space

systems for support of military and intelligence operations will deter them from interference with similar US satellite systems?

Consider how (e.g., electronic methods and direct physical attack), and under what circumstances, they might attempt to neutralize any such US systems including their ground as well as space-based elements.

SOVIET MILITARY R&D AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

9. What progress are the Soviets making in early research and development and advanced technologies which could lead to significant qualitative improvements in existing weapons systems, or to the development of weapon systems based on novel technical means?

10. What progress are the Soviets making toward strategic applications of lasers and beam weapons?

SOVIET ICBM SYSTEMS

11. What progress are the Soviets making in increasing the counterforce capability of their ICBM forces?

Give particular attention to the accuracies of the Soviet SS-X-16, 17, 18 and 19 ICBM systems.

12. What progress are the Soviets making in improving the survivability of their ICBM forces?

Consider whether the Soviets are developing and de-



ploying land-mobile ICBMs, and if so, what progress is being made.

SOVIET NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

13. What are Soviet objectives in nuclear weapons technology, and what progress are the Soviets making in this area?

14. What are Soviet capabilities to conduct chemical and biological warfare and to operate in a radiological environment?

SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES

15. What are Soviet intentions and progress in the development of long-range cruise missile systems for use against land targets?

SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION

16. What is the intended size, role and armament of the Back-fire force?

17. What progress have the Soviets made in development of improved tankers, a follow-on heavy bomber, or a stand-off carrier for air-to-surface missiles?

SOVIET NAVAL SYSTEMS

18. What programs and plans do the Soviets have for the development and deployment of SLBM systems, including modifications to existing systems?

Include any changes made in SSBN operational

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practices and patrol areas, and command and control capabilities.

19. What progress have the Soviets made in development of antiship missile systems?

Include the characteristics of the guidance systems.

20. What progress are the Soviets making toward acquisition of an effective capability for trailing submarines, and for detecting and localizing them in the open ocean?

21. What is the status of Soviet RDT&E on, and what progress is being made toward expanded deployment and improved reporting capabilities of the present satellite borne ocean surveillance systems, and what progress is being made toward deploying a new radar ocean surveillance satellite system which would overcome the limitations of the present system?

#### SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

22. What progress are the Soviets making in ABM development, and what are their plans for further deployment?

23. What progress are the Soviets making in development and deployment of defenses against aircraft and missiles attacking at low altitudes?

#### SOVIET DEFENSE COSTS

24. What are the costs of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons systems and defense programs?

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Include information on how they are financed; how they influence defense planning and overall economic planning and performance; and on how the Soviet weapons research and development and acquisition processes work.

ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

25. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact objectives and positions in arms limitations negotiations?

26. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact intentions and actions -- including any concealment and deception -- with respect to adherence to arms limitations agreements with the United States?

EUROPE: WARSAW PACT - [REDACTED]

25X6A

27. What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact

25X6A

[REDACTED] forces in the [REDACTED]

28. What are the capabilities, including the strengths and weaknesses, of the Warsaw Pact forces for conducting a war in the central region of Europe without prior reinforcement?

29. What are Warsaw Pact views, plans and doctrine for conducting war in Europe, including readiness, mobilization and reinforcement of Pact forces?

30. What are Warsaw Pact capabilities to fight a sustained non-nuclear war in Europe, including critical stockpiles and the operation of the rear services?

31. What are the trends in Soviet strategic airlift capability?



EASTERN EUROPE

33. How are political forces in Yugoslavia evolving, from the standpoints of internal cohesion and international alignment in the post-Tito period?

Give attention to Soviet policy and activity toward Yugoslavia.

34. What trends and developments are likely in USSR-Eastern European relationships -- greater cohesion, greater autonomy, growing conflict?

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### SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 2

*Developments within and policies, intentions, decision-making processes, and capabilities of the People's Republic of China in key political, military and economic areas which impact on important interests of the United States, its allies, the USSR, the rest of Asia and the more influential underdeveloped countries.*

### KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS:

#### CHINA: INTERNAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

35. What major trends and changes are likely in Chinese foreign and military policies relating to the US and the USSR.

Include Chinese policy toward use of nuclear weapons and its general forces' capabilities as well as offensive and defensive postures.

36. What are the internal stresses and alignments within the central leadership and at the key regional levels and how are these likely to affect the main lines of China's foreign policy and its economic and military policies?

Consider how these policies are likely to be changed by the successors to Mao and Chou.

37. Will China maintain its economic development, and to what extent will it rely on the West to support its economy

especially in areas related to its Military Industrial complex?

Include how weapons systems and defense programs are financed and how they influence defense and overall economic planning and performance.

38. What are China's policies and activities towards maintaining and expanding its influence in the Third World, and do these policies contribute to disorder or stability?

Pay particular attention to those PRC activities detrimental to US interests.

39. What are Peking's objectives toward the countries in East Asia; particularly, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam and Japan?

Consider China's capabilities to project itself into the East and South China Seas.

40. Will Chinese and Indian relations with respect to the Himalayan States and Pakistan lead toward military confrontation or accommodation?

41. What will be Chinese tactics against and negotiating position on Taiwan?

Include Peking's reaction to Taiwan's development of a nuclear weapon.

Also consider Taiwan's policies toward Peking, including the relationship of these policies to Taiwan's nuclear development programs.

CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

42. What progress are the Chinese making towards acquiring nuclear capabilities against the US and the USSR, and what is the status of their nuclear R&D technology?

Emphasize locations and capabilities of delivery vehicles, and the numbers and types of weapons in stockpile.

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 3

*Political and military developments and trends (including terrorism) in potentially volatile international situations of strategic concern to the US.*

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

THE MIDDLE EAST

25X1X4

43. What are [REDACTED] Arab (especially Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies toward the major issues of a peace settlement?

25X1X4

44. What are Arab [REDACTED] military capabilities, plans and intentions?

45. How are the major inter-Arab bilateral and multilateral relationships evolving?

Consider the implications of changes in Iranian-

Arab relations.

46. What is the possibility for and implications of serious political and economic problems within the key Middle East countries [REDACTED]

25X1X4

25X1X4



47. What are the plans and actions of the Arab states and Iran for the political use of petrodollars and for the threatened or actual withholding of oil, as a political lever?

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

48. What indications are there of internal and regional instability in South Asia?

Pay special attention to India, Iran, and the roles of the USSR and China and the major powers involved in the area.

49. What is the interplay in Southeast Asia among China, the USSR, and the Communist states of Indochina?

Include the strategies and objectives of the Communist states; North Vietnamese and Chinese support to insurgencies, particularly in Thailand; differences and rivalries among the Communist states; and the reactions of the Southeast Asian countries.

50. What are the prospects for stability in the countries of Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, and for relations with the US?

Include new political, economic or military alignments that may emerge in Southeast Asia and their implications for US relations in

25X6C

25X1X4

the area, [REDACTED]

25X1X4

[REDACTED] regional cooperation

and US economic interests.

25X1X4



52. What developments -- domestic or international -- are likely to seriously undermine the political or economic stability of either North or South Korea, alter the essential military balance on the peninsula, and increase the possibility of hostilities?

25X1X4



**25X1X4**

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LATIN AMERICA

56. What political, economic, and security developments seriously affect important US interests, particularly in major countries?

Include indicators of instability of major governments, blocs or alignments being formed among Latin American states, and public and governmental attitudes on matters at issue between the US and Latin America (Trade Reform Act, future of Panama Canal, etc.)

57. What are Cuban attitudes and interests regarding the normalization of relations with the US and regarding the advocacy of positions undercutting the US in Latin America?

Consider the role that the USSR plays in these processes.

58. What will the Panamanian government's attitudes and actions be during the course of negotiations for a new canal treaty and, if a treaty is signed, during the ratification process?

Include willingness and/or ability to accept delay or breakoff of negotiations, or delay or rejection of a treaty, and plans for pressure tactics against the US, particularly a resort to violent methods.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

59. What political, economic, and security developments affect important US interests?

Include indications of developing international alignments by newly independent countries and effects of US policies on progress toward solution of major problems in southern Africa.

THIRD WORLD

60. What are the major trends and plans of the Third World countries acting in concert with respect to:

- the work of international organizations, including regional economic associations;
- policies toward the US, USSR and China;
- efforts to reduce economic disparity with the industrial world;
- interference with traditional patterns of economic relations, including expropriation without compensation, cartels, and export restraints?

TERRORISM

61. What are the composition, intentions, and capabilities of foreign terrorist or extremist groups?

Include their sources of membership, funds and equipment, the possibility of seizure or production and use of weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as well as nuclear), their impact on government policy, especially toward the US, and stability in their host countries, and any evidence that Communist or other countries are influencing them, or rendering direct support.

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 4

*Policies, intentions and capabilities of foreign states other than the USSR and the PRC to develop nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and delivery systems and to employ them.*

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTION

62. What are the objectives, programs and capabilities of countries other than the US, USSR, UK, France and the PRC for developing or acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems?

Include policies and actions of other countries (including nuclear powers) toward assisting the non-nuclear states in acquiring a nuclear capability.

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 5

Major foreign economic developments and trends relevant to US international policy decisions and negotiations, particularly those related to energy, raw materials, food resources, and to international trade arrangements.

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

PROSPECTS FOR INFLATION AND RECOVERY

25X6A

25X6A 63. [REDACTED]

25X1X4 [REDACTED]

25X1X4 [REDACTED]

Include these governments' foreign economic policies, the domestic developments likely to affect these policies, and consequences for both these economies and the US.

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

64. What are the principal objectives of key countries

25X1X4 [REDACTED]

25X1X4 [REDACTED]

in the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations?

Include their possible negotiating tradeoffs and the electoral and intra-governmental factors that affect



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these objectives and tradeoffs. Are there foreseeable major consequences of alternative provisions of trade agreements, e.g., for foreign trade balances, dollar exchange rates, key industries?

ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR OIL EXPORTERS

65. What are the major oil exporting countries doing with their income?

Include for each capacity to spend and policy on placement of financial reserves. What are the changes in amounts and composition (by location, currency, type of asset and maturity) of their foreign assets?

66. What are the policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities of the major petroleum exporters with respect to the production and marketing of oil?

Include the prospects for the development of major new energy sources, particularly exports of oil from non-OPEC countries, and the impact of such changes on OPEC policies and vulnerabilities.

POLICIES OF PRODUCERS OF IMPORTANT RAW MATERIALS OTHER THAN PETROLEUM

67. What changes in production, marketing and pricing policies are the major producers of important raw materials or primary prod-

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25X1X4    ucts [REDACTED] considering either individually or in concert?

FOREIGN DEMAND FOR US AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

25X1X4    68. What is the likely demand (especially by the USSR, China, India, [REDACTED]) for imports of wheat, soybeans, rice, corn and cotton?

25X1X4    Consider the capabilities of countries other than the US [REDACTED] for supplying these commodities to the world market.

FOREIGN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES

25X1X4    69. What actions are being taken by foreign governments [REDACTED] that could substantially impair the ability of American business to compete for foreign sales, construction, or service contracts in third countries?

LAW OF THE SEA

70. What are the negotiating positions and bargaining vulnerabilities of key countries on the form and content of a Law of the Sea treaty?

Give particular attention to issues on which the attitudes and intentions of these countries are likely to be so contentious as to jeopardize prospects for a treaty even minimally acceptable to the United States.

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## ADDITIONAL KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

### NARCOTICS

71. Who are the major foreign producers, traffickers, and financiers involved in illicit narcotics?

Include their methods of operation, sources of material, facilities, international connections and foreign official involvement, and how and by what routes and timing they move illicit narcotics to the United States.

72. How effective are the anti-narcotics programs of the countries in categories 1 and 2 designated by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control as of priority interest to the US Government's international narcotics control programs?\*

Include the willingness of these governments to cooperate with and commit resources to US efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers and their collaborators. Also,

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\* At present, these two categories include Mexico, Thailand, Burma, Turkey, France, Pakistan, and Colombia; consideration is being given to adding Ecuador, India, and other countries. It should be noted that countries may be added to or dropped from these categories by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control as circumstances dictate.

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identify individuals in the respective governments who protect and facilitate illicit narcotics traffic.

Include the attitudes of government officials and other key political leaders as well as the people concerned with the international narcotics control effort toward present and pending international narcotics conventions and protocols, and specifically toward US and UN efforts.

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